Kenya's Looming Youth Bulge: Infinite Possibility or Definite Disaster?

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Research Paper Abstract

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

ARH&D	Adolescent Reproductive Health and Development
ASTs	Age-Structural Transitions
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CPR	Contraceptive Prevalence Rate
DHS	Demographic Health Survey
FPE	Free Primary Education
GoK	Government of Kenya
GoR	Government of Rwanda
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus / Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
ICPD	International Conference on Population and Development
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
IMR	Infant Mortality rate
K/NYP	Kenya / National Youth Policy
KDHS	Kenya Demographic Household Survey
KKV	Kazi Kwa Vijana
KNBS	Kenya National Bureau of Statistics
KSPA	Kenya Service Provision Assessment
MoEVT	Ministry of Education and Vocational Training
MoH	Ministry of health
MOYAS	Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports
NBS	National Bureau of Statistics
NGOs	Non Governmental Organizations
NPP	National Population Policy
NPPSD	National Population Policy for Sustainable Development
NRHS	National Reproductive Health Strategy
NYC	National Youth Council
NYS	National Youth Service
PAI	Population Action International
RoK	Republic of Kenya
RoR	Republic of Rwanda
RoU	Republic of Uganda
SDHS	Swaziland Demographic Health Survey
STI	Sexually Transmitted Infections
TFR	Total Fertility Rate
TIVET	Technical Industrial Vocational Education and Training
UDHS	Uganda Demographic and Health Survey
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WHO	World Health Organization
YEDF	Youth Enterprise Development Fund
YRC's	Youth Resource Centers

ABSTRACT

The main objective of this paper is to review Kenya's population trends with reference to population growth, age structure, distribution, and its future implications on social, economic and political development. This is in light of the widespread reductions in fertility and mortality rates, which have resulted in changes in the population growth rates.

The growing interest in age structures (the way a population is distributed across different age groups at any given point in time) and associated changes stem from the recognition that people's social economic and political behavior and needs vary at different stages of the lifecycle. Age structures of a population are easily understood via the emerging concept of Age-Structural Transitions (ASTs) which in common parlance is a passage of a birth cohort from one life cycle phase to another e.g. from childhood to youth then to adulthood and to elderly hood. Age structures therefore have far-reaching consequences and can help illustrate a country's risks and opportunities in issues of democracy, development and security.

Kenya's population growth rate rose steadily from about 2.5 percent per annum in 1948 to around 3.8 percent per annum in the 1980s, but has since declined to about 2.7 percent per annum. The population size is currently estimated at 40 million, up from 28.7 million in 1999. Thus, Kenya's population has continued to grow exponentially, currently increasing by nearly 1 million people annually. The rate of growth of Kenya's population is attributed to declining fertility and rapidly falling mortality rates.

The rapid changes in population parameters have had significant implications on the youth population. Just like the overall population, the absolute size of the youth population (15-29) grew from about 2.7 million in 1969 to about 11.14 million in 2009, thus exhibiting an exponential growth. When compared to the total population, the proportion of the youth population has remained steady, at just about a third of the total population since independence, and forms the majority of the potential working population.

The major landmarks in the demographic history of the country are closely linked to the changing phases of Kenya's population policy environment. However, current demographic changes are occurring due to the fact that women are giving birth later, to fewer children and are spacing them

more. In the next decade or so, these changing fertility patterns will shift the population structure from a child rich to a youthful population (a phenomenon popularly referred to as a youth bulge) where 15-29 year olds are expected to form the bulk of the population.

Large youthful populations have been observed to have certain consequences. First, these young people are at their reproductive peak and responsible for population momentum. Currently, this group is responsible for 60% of the one million Kenyans born every year notwithstanding the fact that one out of every four children born was unplanned for. The reproductive decisions they make will determine future birth rates. The United Nations projects that Kenya's population will reach 46 million by 2015, 57 million by 2025, and 85 million by 2050.

Population density is expected to increase from the current 70 people per km^2 to 102 people/km^2 in 2025 and 167 people/km^2 in 2050 causing overcrowding and overuse of natural resources hence the escalation of resource conflicts. The phenomenon also places very high demand on social amenities such as education, health care and sanitation which tend to be concentrated in urban areas causing rural to urban migration. Further, majority of migrants to urban areas from rural areas are 20-29 year olds in search of employment.

There are nearly 500,000 young people entering the job market annually and out of all the unemployed people in the working age-group (15-64), 72% are under age 30. With a very slow pace of creating jobs, there are large cohorts of idle youth who are easily recruited to gangs, militia, vigilante and terrorist groupings which self organize or are exploited and manipulated by politicians to perpetuate a cycle of political instability, ethnic wars, revolutions, and anti-regime activities. Interestingly, between 1970 and 1999, 80% of civil conflicts occurred in countries where 60% of the population or more were under the age of thirty. In countries where youth made up to 35 percent of the total adult population, the risk of conflict increased by 150 percent. Low political will and inadequate resources to effectively integrate young people in meaningful decision making processes exacerbates the problem.

The political and institutional constraints arising from such an environment discourages economic activities and private investments leading to a shrinking per capita income. Between 1970 and 1999, such countries experienced an average annual economic growth rate of 3.6 percent. This

growth can increase if young people are well educated and economically empowered to allow greater personal savings and investments.

United Nations forecasts that the plight of young people in the cities is likely to be one of the main challenges of the century. Owing to the fact that Sub-Sahara's youth bulges are yet to peak, a review of Kenya's population growth, structure and distribution will provide incites to development concerns and future political stability of the country.

1.0 Introduction

The growing interest in age structures (the way a population is distributed across different age groups at any given point in time) and associated changes stem from the recognition that people's social and economic behavior and needs vary at different stages of the lifecycle. Age structures therefore have far-reaching consequences for sectors such as health, education, labor markets, and social protection (Opiyo & Agwanda, 2011). They also can help illustrate a country's risks and opportunities in issues of democracy, development and security (Population Action International [PAI], 2007).

For developing countries such as Kenya, one consequence of rapid population growth, a widespread decline in fertility and a reduction in mortality rates is the changing age structure from a 'child rich' to a 'youthful' population structure, popularly referred to as a *youth bulge*[1]. This phenomenon is widely recognized as a considerable resource for national development but is one that can become a significant source of problems. Thus, the youth bulges, as seen from the demographic, socio-economic and even political viewpoints, will provide the main link to population and development issues and concerns.

1.1 Definition of the term 'youth'

Universally, 'youth' may be defined as a transitional concept - that is a specific stage between childhood and adulthood, when people have to negotiate a complex interplay of both personal and socio-economic changes in order to manoeuvre the transition from dependence to independence, take effective control of their own lives and assume social commitments (UNESCO, 2004). As a result, the term 'youth' varies in its significance and age range from culture to culture depending on when this transition happens. This may help explain the different youth definitions in the region. In the Kenyan constitution (RoK, 2010), youth is defined as individuals in the republic who have attained the age of 18 years but have not attained the age of 35 years. The National Youth Policy of Uganda (RoU, 2001), defines youth as all young persons, female and

[1] *Youth bulges* are extraordinary large youth cohorts relative to the adult population. Kenya's *youth bulge* like the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa is yet to peak.

male, aged 12 to 30 years. However, Uganda's Health Policy (RoU, 2000) defines youth as those between 15 and 24 while the term "adolescents" refers to those aged between 10 and 19.
According to the health policy, 'young people' is therefore a term that covers both age groups, i.e. those between the ages of 10 and 24. National Youth Policy of Rwanda (RoR, 2005), defines youth as persons aged between 14 and 35. These definitions vary from the United Nations definition which considers 'youth', as those persons between the ages of 15 and 24 years, without prejudice to other definitions by Member States. This definition was made during preparations for the International Youth Year (1985) and was endorsed by the General Assembly. Young adults on the other hand are defined as people aged between 25 and 29.

Because of these variances in defining who the youth universally constitute, it therefore becomes imperative to highlight the exact working definition in this paper. In a report titled 'shape of things to come by PAI (Undated: 18), 'age structure types are created by dividing a country's population into three age groups – youth (ages zero to 29 years), mid-adults (30 to 59 years) and older adults (60 and older) – and using those proportions to track the country's position along the demographic transition'. The youth category is further divided into two categories: very young – 0 to 14; and youthful – 15 to 29. Since the AST model forms the theoretical anchor for this paper, youth will therefore be defined as those aged between 15 and 29. This also coincides with UN's definition of youth and young adults.

1.2 Study Objectives

The main objective of this paper is therefore to review Kenya's youth population trends with reference to population growth, age structure, distribution, and its future implications on social, economic and political development. More specifically the work:

- Contextualizes the age structural transitions model
- Gives a situation analysis of Kenya's youth population trends and age structure
- Gives other characteristics of the youth population and their current impact
- Gives possible scenarios that Kenya could face with the changing age structures
- Makes various policy recommendations that should be considered

1.3 Study Methodology and Limitations

Development of this paper involved analysis of secondary information collected through review of relevant literature such as government policy documents, publications and reports produced by international agencies and scholarly articles. The paper therefore relies on available secondary sources of data and no field survey has been conducted

2.0 Theoretical Framework

According to Pool and Wong (2006), age structures of a population are easily understood via the emerging concept of Age-Structural Transitions (ASTs). Simply put, an AST is the passage of a birth cohort from one age group to the next one (usually in 5-year age groups e.g. 0-4, 5-9, 10-14, etc) or, in more common parlance, the passage of a birth cohort from one life cycle phase to another e.g. from childhood to youth. The AST model comprises four phases/age structural types. These include:

- A "Child-Rich" Population Structure

This age structure is also referred to as a young population. According to PAI (2007), countries with young populations have majority of their populations below the age of 15. Two-thirds or more of their population comprises young people under age 30, and only three to six percent of the population is above age 60 as depicted in figure 1. In 2005, there were 62 countries of this type of age structure, including nearly all of Sub-Saharan Africa.



Figure 1: Nigeria as an example of a country with a child-rich population
Source: http://www.populationaction.org/Publications/Fact_Sheets/FS34/Summary.shtml

According to Opiyo & Agwanda (2011), this phenomenon occurs due to an accelerated increase in the number of children following the onset of child mortality decline.

- "Young Adult" Population Structure



This age structure is also referred to as youthful population. According to PAI (2007), countries with youthful age structures are beginning to experience a declining number of under 14's and an expanding number of young adults as depicted in figure 2. This is mainly due to the continued decline of mortality and the onset of fertility decline. In the case of Iran, fertility declined from 6.6 children in 1980-85 to 2.1 children per woman in 2000-05 (PAI, 2010).

Figure 2: Iran as an example a country with a young adult population structure
Source: http://www.populationaction.org/Publications/Fact_Sheets/FS34/Summary.shtml

This phase could start 15-20 years later than the "child-rich" phase. In 2005, as illustrated by PAI, 27 countries fitted this category, including almost all in Central and South Asia, North Africa, and parts of the Middle East.

- "Middle-Aged" Population Structure

This age structure is also referred to as a transitional population. According to Opiyo & Agwanda (2011), the expansion of a middle-aged population starts when the cohorts enlarged by mortality decline and increases in the number of births reach middle ages. It could take 20-30 years after onset of the "young adult" phase or 4-5 decades to produce sufficient numbers of middle-aged population.



Figure 3: Mexico as an examples of a countries with a middle-aged population structure
Source: http://www.populationaction.org/Publications/Fact_Sheets/FS34/Summary.shtml

- "Old-Aged" Population Structure

This age structure is also referred to as a mature population. It expands after birth rates have dropped to very low levels. According to PAI (2007), the largest age group consists of working-age adults from 30 through 59 years old, comprising 40 to 55 percent of the population as illustrated in figure 4. In 2005, this category included 47 countries across Europe, the former Soviet Republics and East Asia.



Figure 4: Germany and Japan as examples of countries with old -aged population structures
Source: http://www.populationaction.org/Publications/Fact_Sheets/FS34/Summary.shtml

2.1 Factors Distorting the Distinct Age Structure Types

There are factors that distort the distinct age structure types described in section 2.0. These include migration and very high HIV infection rates.

- Migration

Labor migration in the Arab gulf makes their age structures, which are in the middle-aged population structure more exaggerated than they really are. Net migration rate is 19 migrant(s)/1,000 people (2011 est.)



Figure 5: Population Pyramid of Dubai at the end of 2008
Source: http://www.dsc.gov.ae/Publication/Dubai_Population_08_english.pdf

- Very high HIV infection rates

In places with very high HIV infection rates like Southern Africa, two to three percent of the working-age adults die each year, more than ten times the normal rate, shrinking the working population (CSO, 2007 June) as illustrated in figure 6.

Table 1: HIV Prevalence in Swaziland

Percentage HIV positive among the population age 2 and older who were tested, by age and sex, Swaziland 2006-07

	Women		Men		Total	
Age	Percentage HIV positive[1]	Number	Percentage HIV positive[1]	Number	Percentage HIV positive[1]	Number
2-4	4.8	427	5.5	393	5.1	820
5-9	3.6	670	4.8	697	4.2	1,367
10-14	3.3	744	1.9	657	2.6	1,402
15-19	10.2	1,161	1.9	1,277	5.8	2,438
20-24	38.2	926	12.3	787	26.3	1,714
25-29	48.9	654	27.8	557	39.2	1,211
30-34	45.7	542	43.9	383	44.9	925
35-39	37.6	449	44.9	321	40.7	770
40-44	27.6	386	40.0	234	32.3	620
45-49	21.7	345	27.7	230	24.1	575
50-54	24.1	145	28.3	106	25.9	251
55-59	9.5	103	17.4	70	12.7	172
60+	6.9	346	13.2	229	9.4	575
Total	22.1	6,900	14.9	5,941	18.8	12,841

[1]HIV positive refers only to those infected with HIV-1

Source: CSO (2007, June)



HIV prevalence among 15-29 years old women in Swaziland is 32.4% while that of young men the same age is 14%. Thus an average of 23% of all 15-29 year olds in Swaziland are HIV positive as illustrated on table 1. Overall, 19 percent of the population is infected with the HIV virus thus distorting the population structure as illustrated by figure 6.

Figure 6: Swaziland as an example of a country whose population structure is distorted by high HIV infection rate
Source: http://www.populationaction.org/Publications/Fact_Sheets/FS34/Summary.shtml

3.0 Situational Analysis of Kenya's Youth Population

3.1 Kenya's Population Trends and Age Structure

Population Trends

As indicated on table 2, Kenya's *overall population* has continued to grow exponentially and by 2009, the population size was slightly over seven fold the population in 1948 and over four fold that of 1962 (Sivi-Njonjo, 2010). Kenya's population growth rate rose steadily from about 2.5 percent per annum in 1948 to around 3.8 percent per annum in the 1980s – a pace described as one of the fastest ever recorded in history. The initial rise in population growth rate was attributed to high and rising fertility with rapidly declining mortality rates. The current *population growth rate* is estimated at 2.7%.

Table 2: Population Size and Growth in Kenya (1948-2009)

	Census Year						
	1948	1962	1969	1979	1989	1999	2009***
Population (millions)	5.4	8.6	10.9	15.3	21.4	28.7	39.1
Annual growth rate (Percent per annum)	2.5	3.0	3.3	3.8	3.3	2.9	2.7
Absolute increase per annum ('000)	135	258	360	581	792	850	1,017
Size relative to 1948 (1948=100)	100	159.3	201.9	283.3	396.3	531.5	724.1
Size relative to 1962 (1962=100)	-	100	126.7	177.9	248.8	333.7	454.7

Source: Compiled from the 1948, 1962, 1969, 1979, 1989 and 1999 Kenya Population Census Reports in Sivi-Njonjo (2010)

*** Based on projections

As indicated on table 3, *youth population* (15-29 year olds) has been increasing since 1969 to 2009. Youth population in 2009 census was four (4) times that of 1969 and constitutes 28.8% of the total population. Those aged between 0-14 years constitute 42.92% of the total population thus under 29's constitute 71.7% of Kenya's population.

Table 3: Youth Population Trends (1969 - 2009)

Youth Population Growth (1969 - 2009)					
Age	**1969**	**1979**	**1989**	**1999**	**2009**
15-19	1,104,999	1,741,845	2,378,696	3,403,178	4,169,543
20-24	878,111	1,327,404	1,902,934	2,832,918	3,775,103
25-29	760,839	1,055,712	1,629,761	2,259,503	3,201,226

Total	2,743,949	4,124,961	5,911,391	8,495,599	11,145,872

Source: Various Census Reports in Sivi-Njonjo (2010)

According to the 2009 census, the female population is slightly higher than the male population in all the age cohorts. Overall, 15-29 year old females constitute 51% while their male counterparts constitute 49% of the youth population. Opiyo & Agwanda (2011) assert that the youthfulness of a population is always indexed by the *median age* (the age at which half the population is above or below). According to the world population prospects, Kenya's median age declined from about 20 years in 1950 to 19 in 1955. It further declined to 17 in 1960, 15.8 in 1965, 15.5 in 1970, and to 15 in 1985 before beginning to rise to 15.5 in 1990, 16.5 in 1995, 17.4 in 2000, 18 in 2005 and finally to 18.5 in 2010 (UN, 2007). The World Population Prospects (2009) put Kenya's *population density* in 2009 at 69 people per Km^2.

According to Opiyo and Agwanda (2011), the pace at which mortality and fertility change and the length of time between mortality decline and fertility decline determines the rate of population growth that will be observed.

Total Fertility Rates (TFR) is the sum of age-specific fertility rates in a given year, and can be interpreted as the number of births a woman would have in her lifetime, given the age-specific probabilities of birth in that year. The TFR is a useful summary of the actual fertility behavior of women in a given period. Table 4 shows the TFR of countries in Eastern and Southern Africa that have participated in the DHS programme.

Table 4: TFR of countries in Eastern and Southern Africa

Country	**Year**	**TFR**
Uganda	2006	6.7
Rwanda	2005	6.1
Malawi	2004	6.0
Zambia	2001-2001	5.9
Tanzania	2004	5.7
Mozambique	2003	5.5
Ethiopia	2005	5.4

Madagascar	2003-2004	5.2
Kenya	2003	4.9
Eritrea	2002	4.8
Namibia	2000	4.2
Lesotho	2004	3.5

Source: UBS, 2007

Uganda and Rwanda have the highest TFR's in Eastern Africa i.e. 6.7 and 6.1 respectively compared to Tanzania (5.7) and Kenya (4.9) in the region. As indicated on table 5, from 1948 to the early 1960's, TFR in Kenya oscillated from 6 to 6.8 before increasing to an average of 7.8 in the late 60's to the late 70's. Since 1989, TFR has been reducing gradually from 6.6 and is currently at an average of 4.6 children per woman.

Infant Mortality Rates (IMR) measure the number of live births that die before age one (1) divided by the total number of births (expressed per 1000 live births). It is a good indicator of decline in mortality. IMR has generally been declining since 1948 when it was at 184/1000 to 2009 where it was 52/1000 as indicated on table 5.

Life expectancy at birth in Kenya is 54 years as indicated on table 5. However, the World Development Indicators put it at 54.9 years in 2009 (World Bank, 2011, April 26).

Table 5: Population Dynamics

Year	48	62	63	**69**	**79**	**84**	**87**	**89**	**92**	**93**	**94**	**96**	**00**	**03**	**05**	**09**
Population (Millions)	5.4	8.6	8.9	10.9	15.3	18.4	21.8	21.4	24.6	25.3	26.1	27.4	30	33	35.1	39
Fertility rate	6	6.8	6.8	7.6	7.9	7.7	7.7	6.6	5.4	5.4	4.9	4.7	4.9	4.9	4.6	4.6
Crude death rate /1000	25	20	20	17	14	13	13	12	12	10	12	13.3	13.7	14	11.9	13
Crude birth rate/1000	50	50	50	50	52	50	50	48	46	46	40	38	42	42	39.7	39
Life Expectancy at birth	35	44	44	49	54	62	56	60	54	54	53	50	49	49	53	54
Infant Mortality rate /1000	184		120	118	104	64.4	80	71.2	86.2	86.7	87.3	94.2	82	77	65.5	52
Under-5 mortality rate /1000	na		156		0	88.1		98	123	123	124	137	116	115	90.5	74
Number of births p.a.('000)	270	430		545	796			1,027					1,185			1,525
Number of deaths p.a. ('000)	135	172		185	214			235					336			508

Absolute increase p.a. ('000)	135	258		360	581			792					850			1,017
Adult HIV mortality rate /1000	na		0		0	0		3.1	4.7	5.3	6.7	8.5	13.4	6.7	7.4 (07)	6.3

Source: UNDP (2006), GoK (2010)

The *crude birth rates (CBR)* and *crude death rates (CDR)* in Figure 7 are the ultimate determinants of the population growth. However, they are not the best indicators of fertility behavior or basic mortality conditions since they are affected by age structure (Opiyo and Agwanda, 2011).



Figure 7: Trends in Kenya's crude birth and death rates since 1962
Source: Opiyo and Agwanda (2011)

The initial rise in population growth rate was attributed to high and rising fertility with rapidly declining mortality rates. The peak change occurred between 1970s and 1980 when birth rates rose to the highest levels and death rates to the lowest levels. It is this period when Kenya marked the highest rate of natural increase. As a result of the rapidly changing birth and death rates, the absolute increase in population rapidly rose from 135, 000 persons per annum in 1948 to slightly over 1 million in the recent past (Opiyo and Agwanda, 2011).

Contraceptive Prevalence Rate (CPR) is the percentage of currently married women aged 15-49 who are using any method of family planning. As indicated in figure 8, CPR in Kenya is 46%. 39% of the women use modern methods while 9% use traditional methods (GoK, 2010). These contraceptive trends among other factors help explain lowering fertility rates.



Figure 8: Trends in contraceptive use among married women aged 15 – 49 from 1978 - 2008
Source, KDHS, 2009

Age Structural Transitions

Figure 9 shows the past and present age structures of the Kenyan population. As indicated, Kenya's population structure has been characterized by a high population of children.



Figure 9: Kenya's age structure in 1970 and 2010
Source: Various Census Reports

A close look at the population structure does indicate that it has been changing over time. As depicted in figure 10, the proportion of persons aged 0-14 years has been declining since the 1980s when it reached a peak of about 50%, while that of producers (aged 15-64 years) has been rising consistently.



Figure 10: Age Structural Transitions Kenya, 1950 – 2050
Source: UN, 2007

When compared to the total population, the proportion of the youth population (15-29) has been slowly increasing from one quarter of the total population to one third of the total population as illustrated in figure 11.



Figure 11: Kenya's Youth population as a percentage of the total population
Source: Kenya National Bureau of Standards

3.2 Other Characteristics of the Youth Population and their Current Impact

Increasing youth populations increase the demand for education, health, and employment. It also has implications for rural to urban migration and urbanization processes.

- Education

According to K'oliech (2011), the impact of presidential decrees on the provision of state subsidized primary education significantly increases enrolment. President Kibaki's decree of 2003 resulted in an increase in enrolments from 6,062,742 in 2002 to 7,159,523 in 2003. Previous years were characterized by stagnated enrolments mainly because parents were expected to foot virtually all input and supply costs with the exception of teachers. The high cost of primary education to most families in the lowest income quintile effectively increased the opportunity cost of schooling at this level, hence non-participation by the majority of children from such economic backgrounds.

As an indicator of learner survival beyond the primary education cycle, the primary secondary transition rate shows the proportion of primary school completers who proceed to form 1 in the subsequent year. Analysis shows that the overall transition rate remained below 47 percent between 1999 and 2004 as shown on table 6. The overall transition rates rose above the 50 percent mark for the first time in 2005 with boys constituting 57.7 and girls 54.2 percent. The 2007 transition rate further increased to 59.6 percent. The increase in the transition rates can in part be attributed Free Primary Education and the re-entry of former drop outs.

Table 6: Primary to Secondary Transition Rates, 1998-2007

Year in Std 8	Year In Form 1	Enrolment In Std 8 ('000)			Enrolment In Form 1 ('000)			% Transiting to Form 1		
		Boys	Girls	Total	Boys	Girls	Total	Boys	Girls	Total
1998	1999	221.0	215.3	436.3	105.2	95.8	201.0	47.6	44.5	46.1
1999	2000	246.6	228.0	474.6	108.1	97.2	205.3	43.8	42.6	43.3
2000	2001	235.6	227.8	463.4	112.2	103.4	215.6	47.6	45.4	46.5
2001	2002	261.7	246.6	508.3	116.2	105.2	221.5	44.4	42.7	43.6
2002	2003	296.9	244.5	541.3	129.4	121.7	251.1	43.6	49.8	46.4

2003	2004	280.8	267.5	548.3	132.6	118.6	251.2	47.2	44.3	45.8
2004	2005*	343.0	314.8	657.7	198.0	170.6	368.3	57.7	54.2	56.0
2005	2006	335.5	307.9	643.5	195.7	173.0	368.7	58.3	56.2	57.3
2006	2007	372.3	332.7	704.9	210.3	210.1	420.5	56.5	63.2	59.6

Source: MoE (2008)

From table 6, it is only in two transition years 2002-2003 and 2006-2007 when the proportions of girls transiting from Std 8 to Form 1 was higher. In terms of absolute numbers, however, the number of boys transiting to Form 1 remained consistently higher for the entire period. Considering the fact that there is near gender parity during standard 1 entry, these findings suggest that young women are most disadvantaged in terms of access to secondary education.

A closer look at secondary school enrolment by form reveals that there are a significant number of students dropping out of school. As indicated on table 7, an average of 28% of youth enrolling in form one drop out before completing form four.

Table 7: Secondary School Enrolment by Form, 2004-2008*

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Form I	189,119	208,759	235,746	256,746	251,063	272,702	263,853	299,461	312,969	387,673
Form II	184,988	197,628	202,314	206,046	238,046	238,638	232,338	251,092	323,046	359,664
Form III	168,164	185,956	193,690	206,046	203,908	223,093	228,682	236,421	292,668	337,573
Form IV	152,124	170,071	185,907	185,184	186,939	190,717	209,276	243,106	251,584	297,301
Total	700,538	762,414	817,657	836,521	879,956	925,150	934,149	1,030,08	1,180,26	1,382,21
% dropout rate between form 1 and 1v	27	27	29	31	29	29	28	29	27	28

Sources: Republic of Kenya; Kenya National Bureau of Statistic, Statistical Abstracts 2003-2009, Economic Surveys 2002-2009

Table 8: Secondary to University Transition Rates, 1999/00 to 2008/09

KCSE Year of Admission	99/00	00/01	01/02	02/03	03/04	04/05	05/06	06/07	07/08	08/09
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Secondary School Candidates Registered	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
No. qualified for admission (C+ and above)	17.9	17.6	22.7	21.6	21.6	24.0	26.2	26.1	25.9	26.9
Candidates Admitted	**4.8**	**5.1**	**6.2**	**5.7**	**5.6**	**5.3**	**4.9**	**6.1**	**7.0**	**...**

* The latest enrolment data available from the most credible source; the MoE EMIS section do not include enrolment and other indicators for 2009.

No. of Male	64.6	65.0	64.6	62.1	62.1	...	...	...	...	...
No. of Female	35.4	35.0	35.4	37.9	37.9	...	...	...	...	...

... No data **Source:** Commissioner of Higher Education

Though secondary to public university transition rates have fluctuated over the past ten academic years, they average 6% as indicated on table 8. According to K'oliech (2011), these low secondary-university transition rates are an indication of an almost elitist publicly provided university education. In effect, this leaves the majority of the candidates who qualify for university admission, to either compete for the expensive private entry scheme or opt for other less costly forms of tertiary education. In the worst of instances, many deserving cases for university are forced to terminate their education after completing form four. Even though admissions through the private entry scheme appears to be improving access to university education by taking in more qualified students, it only helps in widening the inequality gap in access to university education. This is because, often, students from the more economically privileged families dominate such access. Efforts have been made by university education financing institutions such as HELB to offer future income contingent loans to students enrolled on the private entry scheme. However, the amount of full loan offered (US$600) still constitutes an insignificant proportion for high-cost programmes such as medicine which require about US$ 5,000.

Un/employment

Youth in Kenya have constituted a large part of the working population[2]. As illustrated on table 9 young people aged 15 to 29 formed 55% of the working age population in 2005/06.

Table 9: Distribution of Working Age Population, 1998/99 and 2005/06

Age Cohort	Employed		Unemployed		Inactive[3]		Total	
	1998/99	2005/06	1998/99	2005/06	1998/99	2005/06	1998/99	2005/06
15-19	843,909	1,056,015	270,217	352,357	2,349,270	3,210,685	3,463,396	4,619,057
20-24	1,435,405	1,895,834	533,078	605,167	485,067	992,053	2,453,550	3,493,054
25-29	1,584,271	2,088,468	291,679	388,747	165,931	335,359	2,041,881	2,812,574

[2] In Kenya the working age population includes persons between 15 and 64 years.

[3]Inactive labour consists of all those persons within the working age are outside the labour market. Inactivity may be voluntary (persons who prefer to stay at home or are still in school/college) or involuntary (persons who prefer to work but are discouraged and give up searching for jobs).

Total (15-29)	3,863,585	5,040,317	1,094,974	1,346,271	3,000,268	4,538,097	7,958,827	10,924,685
% of 15-29 of the total working pop	36.7	39.7	60.8	72.5	83.4	86.2	50	55.1
30-34	1,541,604	1,897,206	185,927	154,360	94,668	169,153	1,822,199	2,221,097
35-39	1,533,196	1,497,662	140,147	122,725	91,739	101,214	1,765,082	1,721,601
40-44	1,128,190	1,357,371	113,165	92,262	68,964	91,978	1,310,319	1,541,611
45-49	992,261	1,070,783	88,596	64,636	67,260	81,760	1,148,117	1,217,179
50-54	702,199	787,417	66,839	38,666	82,769	95,607	851,807	921,690
55-59	412,639	624,308	64,235	26,350	87,107	91,389	563,981	742,047
60-64	351,936	432,972	46,739	11,024	106,457	96,536	505,132	540,532
Total (15-64)	**10,525,609**	**12,708,035**	**1,800,623**	**1,856,294**	**3,599,231**	**5,266,112**	**15,925,463**	**19,830,441**

Source: Source: 98/99 and 2005/06 Labour Force Survey

Table 10: Youth Unemployment in Kenya between 1978 and 05/06

Age Cohort	1978	1986	1998/99	2005/06
15 – 19	26.6	36.2	47	25
20 – 24	18.5	29.2	47.3	24.2
25 – 29	4.8	8.6	25.1	15.7
	17	25	40	22
30 – 34	2	2.7	14.3	7.5
35 – 39	1.8	2.1	12	7.6
40 – 44	0.7	0.7	11.2	6.4
45 – 49	1.1	2	14.7	5.7
50 – 54	1.4	0.9	18.9	4.7
55 – 59	1.5	4.1	40.6	4
60 – 64	3.2		45.2	2.5
Overall Average	**6.7**	**9.7**	**25.1**	**12.7**

Source: GOK, Various Statistical Abstracts

Table 10 confirms the variation of unemployment trends of different demographic groups. Even though the unemployment rate in the economy eased in 2005/2006 when compared to 1998/99, the youth unemployment level was almost double (22%) that of the overall (12.7%) unemployment rate.

Table 11: Unemployment Rates by Age group, Region and Gender

	Rural			Urban			Total		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Overall	9.5	10.2	9.8	15	25.9	19.9	11.2	14.3	12.7
15-19	18.2	21.1	19.6	42.3	47.8	45.5	22.4	27.7	25
20-24	16.8	20.3	18.6	30.1	40.8	35.8	21	27.3	24.2
25-29	11.1	12.1	11.6	17.3	29.1	22.8	13.5	17.9	15.7
Av (15-29)	15	18	17	30	39	35	19	24	22
30-34	5.6	7.2	6.4	6.8	14.3	9.8	6.1	9.2	7.5
35-39	6.7	5.7	6.1	7.2	14.7	10.6	6.9	8.3	7.6
40-44	5.2	4.7	4.9	9.2	12.3	10.5	6.4	6.4	6.4
45-49	4.3	5.6	5	6.3	10.4	7.8	4.9	6.5	5.7
50-54	4.5	3.8	4.1	6.4	8.5	7.1	4.9	4.4	4.7
55-59	4.8	2.8	3.8	4.9	6.2	5.3	4.8	3.2	4
60-64	3.9	0.8	2.3	5.6	1.4	4.2	4.2	0.8	2.5

Source: Economic Survey 2008

There continues to be disproportionate participation of women in the labour market. This is evidenced by the fact that among 15-29 year olds, unemployment is high among young women (24%) than among young men (19%). Unemployment is severe among youth in urban (35%) areas than in rural areas (17%). However, the most affected are young women in urban areas whose unemployment rate is 39% as shown on table 11. Though unemployment is highest among 15-19 year olds (25%), this may be explained by the fact that majority of young people in this age group are still in school and are not likely to be looking for jobs. 20-24 year olds (24%) and 25-29 year olds (16%) form the next groups of highly unemployed.

According to Omolo (2011), Kenya's unemployment is mainly attributed to the slow growth and weak labour absorptive capacity of the economy, mismatch in skills development and demand, imperfect information flow and inherent rigidities within the country's labour market. The rate at which the net jobs were created is not the same as the rate of labour force growth. This is evidenced by the fact that the informal sector has been growing at an average rate of 17.2% per annum compared to the formal sector which has been growing at an average of 2.23% per annum while the country's working age population increased by 24.5% between 1999 and 2006. This

effectively means that more job seekers[4], both the new labour market entrants and those out of employment through the various labour separation mechanisms, ordinarily remain out of employment for a longer period hence swelling the ranks of the discouraged job seekers. According to Omolo (2011), the longer people stay out of work, the more their "employability" deteriorates, making it progressively harder for them to gain employment. This is especially worrying for the youth who may get trapped into a lifetime of weak attachment to the labour market alternating between low paid insecure work and open unemployment.

Because of the acute youth unemployment problem, the government in January 2009 started the Youth **Employment Marshall Plan** with the objective of creating 500,000 new jobs annually in both the formal and informal sectors (UNDP, 2010, June). The Marshall Plan includes: Kazi kwa Vijana; The Trees for Jobs Initiative; Roads 2000 Project; Youth Enterprise Development Fund (YEDF); Technical Industrial Vocational Education and Training (TIVET)

Kazi Kwa Vijana (KKV)[5] is a labor intensive initiative to give jobs to the youth in order to tackle the twin problems of hunger and unemployment. The government estimates that about 300,000 youth a year will get jobs throughout the country in public works projects. Some of these projects, particularly those providing irrigation and water, are also intended to enhance food production in areas affected by drought. Waste collection and other cleaning activities in urban areas are also being implemented through local councils, with the aim of improving living conditions in poor urban neighborhoods. At the constituency level, these funds are used to hire youth at the rate of US$ 2.50 per day for a period of three months. By end of September 2009, 296,000 youths aged between 18 and 35 years, had been employed. It is hoped that the youth will earn a wage that could help them start their own businesses (GoK, 2009 April).

Young people's evaluation of KKV has been both supportive and critical. Many young people appreciated the opportunity to obtain an income, albeit doing menial work for limited periods of time. However, many were also strongly negative because: there is no capacity building or training

[4] There are 500,000 new job seekers every year
[5] Is a Kiswahili phrase - *Jobs for the youth*

involved, and the work is largely manual and some youth view this as *madharau*[6]; the work is very short term, and the pay is low such that some young people have coined the phrase *'kazi kwa vijana, pesa kwa wazee'*[7]; and youth believe that there is political motivation and favoritism in the selection process (Sivi-Njonjo, Muriu & Muigei, 2010). According to UNDP (2010, June), the challenge is to shift KKV from an emergency initiative to a long-term programme that sustainably tackles youth unemployment problems. To succeed in this programme it is increasingly clear that the government and its stakeholders at all levels must continually strengthen their capacity.

The 'Trees for Jobs' Initiative is partly financed by UNDP and aims to plant 90 million seedlings per year and employ over 29,000 youth in its first two years. The programme contributes to addressing two problems facing Kenya: deforestation and youth unemployment. For the programme to benefit a large cross-section of the youth, projects are spread throughout the country.

Roads 2000 Project was implemented by the Ministry of Roads and Public Works. The project was designed to create short-term labor-intensive employment for young people.

Youth Enterprise Development Fund (YEDF) seeks to enhance youth participation in socio-economic development through the provision of credit to youth enterprises. In the 2006/07 budget, the government allocated one billion Kenya shillings to the fund to enable young entrepreneurs to access finance to set up or expand businesses. By September 2008, 1.34 billion shillings had been disbursed through financial intermediaries to finance 47,722 youth enterprises. The fund had also disbursed 322 million shillings to 7,840 youth groups spread across Kenya. According to the available data, a total of 34,616 female youths and 26,144 male youths had benefited from the YDEF by September 2009. The higher number of women recipients was a result of a specific policy bias towards helping women. Loan repayment has been cited as one of the main challenges of the fund

[6] A Kiswahili word for *contempt*
[7] Is a Kiswahili phrase – *the work is done by the youth and the money is for the older folks*

Technical Industrial Vocational Education and Training (TIVET) component of the Kenya Education Sector Support Programme enhances hands-on youth education and training for developing self-reliance and entrepreneurship.

Overall, the programmes have not solved the unemployment crisis in Kenya

HIV Prevalence

Among the critical health problems young people face are those associated with sexuality and reproductive health such as early and unprotected sexual activity. These have a significant bearing on both their current and future health status. The emergence of HIV/AIDS and its impact is posing one of the greatest challenges. The epidemic has changed the family landscape, resulting in a re-organization of roles and responsibilities, disrupting the lives of young people and driving up health care costs. Apart from increasing orphan hood, HIV/AIDS also increases vulnerability of young people and puts them at risk of exploitation. In addition, the high burden on young people working as care givers to family members jeopardizes their ability to prepare for the future as some may have to leave school to be able to fend for themselves and their families (Muganda-Onyando, 2011).



Figure 12: HIV Prevalence among young women and men Aged 15-29
Source: Sivi-Njonjo, 2010

According to GoK (2010), Kenya's HIV prevalence is 6.3%. Among youth and as depicted in figure 12, in the 15-29 age bracket, HIV is highest among women than men. For women, the prevalence peaks at the age of 30-34 where prevalence is 13.3% and begins to reduce in the following years to 11.2% and to 9.4% in the 35-39 and 40 – 44 age cohorts respectively. For men however, the prevalence continues to rise to 8.9%, 9.3% and 10.2% in the 30-34, 35-39 and 40 – 44 age cohorts where it peaks before it starts declining. This pattern is attributed to men in their mid-life crisis having sexual relationships with younger women. According to the 2009 KDHS report, overall prevalence of HIV among youth aged 15-29 years was 4.7%. However, when you look at individual ages of 15 to 24 year olds, the prevalence varies from 2.5% - 12% among young women of that age and 0.41% to 2.6% among young men of the same age. By 24 years, women were 5.2 times more likely to be infected with HIV than young men of the same age (GoK, 2009).

Table 12: HIV Prevalence among Women and Men Aged 15-29 by 2003, 2007 & 2009 KDHS Reports

Age Group	**Male**			**Female**		
	Year			**Year**		
	2003	**2007**	**2009**	**2003**	**2007**	**2009**
15-19	0.4	1	0.7	3	3.5	2.7
20-24	2.4	1.9	1.5	9	7.4	6.4
25-29	7.3	7.3	6.5	12.9	10.2	10.4
Total	10.06	10.2	8.7	24.9	21.1	19.5
Average	3.35	3.4	2.9	8.3	7.03	6.5

Source: Sivi-Njonjo, 2010

As indicated on table 12, HIV prevalence among 15-29 year old men slightly increased between 2003 and 2007 from 3.35% to 3.4% before declining to 2.9%. Among women, prevalence decreased from 8.3% in 2003 to 7% in 2007 and further to 6.5% in 2009. In the 2003 KDHS report, HIV prevalence peaked for both males and females at age 25—29. In 2007, male and female prevalence peaked at age 30-34. This may be attributed to the fact that those infected in 2003 moved the 30-34 age brackets by 2007.

Age of first sexual encounter has consistently been rising. The earlier the age of the first sexual encounter, the higher the chances of contracting HIV. HIV prevalence is also consistently high

among young men who are uncircumcised and was approximately five (5) times higher among uncircumcised than circumcised men in all age groups except among 15-24 year olds (GoK, 2009).

Migration and Urbanization

According to Opiyo & Agwanda (2011), migration is another component of population change. Migration is a complex phenomenon mainly because it must be defined in both spatial and temporal dimensions which include: type of change of boundary (internal vs. international); direction of the move (rural-rural, rural-urban, urban-rural etc); distance covered; timing and duration of stay (long term verses short term); and periodicity (repetitiveness). Different combinations of such parameters lead to different types of moves which have not been adequately researched in Kenya. However, labor migration is an important phenomenon because it links to the urbanization process. As a way to escape poverty, many young people set out for better opportunities through migration. Indeed, migration to urban areas is unavoidable and even desirable as a way to improve allocation of human resources, especially in land-scarce countries.

Table 13: Trends of Urbanization in Kenya

Year	Population	Urban ('000)	% Urban	Urban annual growth rate (% per annum)
1948	5,406	285	5.2	
1962	8636	671	7.8	6.3
1969	10,943	1,082	9.9	7.1
1979	15,334	2,314	15.1	7.9
1989	21,444	3,864	18	5.3
1999	28,686	5,954	20.8	4.4

Source: Bocquier et al 2009 in Sivi-Njonjo (2010)

As illustrated on table 14, Kenya's urban population grew four times from 5.2% in 1948 to 20.8 in 1999. Despite this growing percentage of urban population, Nairobi and Mombasa accounted for 51% of the total urban population. This is one of the impediments to sufficient expansion of the labor market and spread of the labor force as most industries and public offices are situated in the two cities. Secondly, though the urban population is growing fast, the economic growth and development transformations necessary to support it and enhance the quality of urban life are not occurring at the same rate. Most of the migrants come as young adults, usually after secondary

school with employment as the motivation for migration. The majority of migrants were still males, a pattern that traces back to the pre-independence era until recently. However the sex distribution is more balanced now, a fact reflected in the male to female ratio, which has been reducing from one generation to the next.

Figure 13 displays typical age patterns of urban population in Kenya. Majority of urban dwellers are young adults in the age group 15-29 typically fueled by urban rural migration or urban to urban migration. According to Opiyo & Agwanda (2011), this has far-reaching consequences. It increases the strain for jobs without necessarily improving the job conditions of those who are left in rural areas; impacts provision of public goods, education, utilities, housing, and infrastructure; and affects demographic and skills composition in both urban and rural areas. The UN forecasts that the plight of young people in the cities is likely to be one of the main challenges of the century.



Figure 13: Age patterns of urban population in Kenya
Source: KDHS, 2003 and Census, 1989

4 Possible Demographic Scenarios for Kenya

4.1 Demographic Transitions

Like the rest of East Africa and as indicated in section 3, Kenya predominantly has a young population that has been experiencing demographic changes. As a result of changing fertility patterns and mortality rates and the fact that women are giving birth later, spacing their children more or giving birth to fewer children (Sivi-Njonjo, 2010), the country will transition from a child rich to youthful population structure in the next 10-15 years as illustrated in figure 14, where 15-29 year olds will form the bulk of the population (PAI, 2010). Other factors such as level of education, un/employment, HIV/AIDS, migration and urbanization, will not only determine how these trends evolve but also determine the country's risks and opportunities.

Kenya's Demographic Transitions



Figure 14: Kenya's Demographic Transition
Source: http://www.populationaction.org/Publications/Reports/The_Shape_of_Things_to_Come_Interactive_Database/Index.shtml

As indicated on table 15, fertility rates are expected to decrease from the current 4.6 in 2009 to about 3.6 in 2025. IMR is also expected to decrease from 52 (see table 5) to 49 children per 1000. This will reduce the population annual growth from 2.7 to 2 in 2025. However, population will increase from the current 40 million people to 57.6 million people in 2025. According to the UN (2007), the median age of Kenyans is expected to reach 20 years in 2025 from the current 18 years.

Table 14: Future Population Dynamics of Kenya

	Projections					
	2000-2005	2005-2010	2010-2015	2015-2020	2020-2025	2025-2050
Fertility rate	5.00	4.96	4.54	4.04	3.59	2.39
Infant Mortality Rate (IMR per 1,000 births)	70	64.4	58.4	53.3	49.2	28.3
Population in millions	31.4 – 35.8	35.8 – 40.9	40.9 – 46.4	46.4 - 52	52 -57.6	80.1 – 85.4

(Medium variant)						
Population Density (Per km^2)	54 - 61	61 -70	70 - 80	80 - 91	91 - 102	102 - 167
Annual Population Growth Rate	2.61	2.65	2.55	2.26	2.02	1.26
Life expectancy	51	54.1	56.8	58.6	59.5	67.2

Source: UN, 2007

4.2 Challenges and Opportunities Posed by Various Demographic Projections

- *Overpopulation and Overcrowding*

The first challenge posed by youthful populations is the fact that 15 to 29 year old women are at the peak of their reproductive age.



Figure 15: Trends in contribution (percent) of various age groups to the total fertility
Source: 1977/78 Kenya fertility survey and 1988/89, 1993, 1998, 2003 and 2008/09 Kenya Demographic and Health Surveys

As illustrated on figure 15, 15-29 year olds are currently responsible for 60.9% of the 1 million Kenyans produced every year. With young people being sexually active at much younger ages there are several implications. Currently, 36% of young girls in Kenya are already mothers. In fact, one

out of every four babies born was not planned. The reproductive decisions that this age group makes will therefore determine their lifetime fertility rates and, subsequently, rate of population growth. The continued early onset of childbearing will exacerbate the future population growth. If by 2025, the population would have increased by 44%, from 40 million to 57.6 million, high population density is inevitable resulting to overcrowding. The problem is worsened by cultural and religious influences among some communities. Population pressure is also worsened by politicians who see it as an avenue of ethnic domination and therefore incite people to reject family planning.

- *Increased HIV/AIDs infections*

Even though HIV/AIDs infections are generally on a downward trend in the country, the fact that young people are engaging more and more in risky sexual behavior[8], can increase the rate of new infections among the 15-29 age group (Sivi-Njonjo, 2010). An acute rise of infections would lead to high mortality rates thus reducing the working age population significantly like in the Southern African region.

- *Increased demand for social amenities such as education, health care and sanitation; improved quality of life; reduced population increase; increased workforce and reduced dependency ratio*

With more young people comes an increased demand for education, health care and sanitation infrastructure. Low supply of these essential services would cause more disgruntlement from an already relatively deprived segment of the population which would worsen future conflicts as argued by Freeman (2005). However, if Kenya adequately increased its social financing and ensure equal and quality provision of education, health and sanitation facilities to all youth at all levels, quality of life would improve and eventually bring about chances of better socio-economic opportunities. Like in Korea during the peak of its youth bulge in the mid seventies, the governments increase in education by 653% while reducing the number of out-of-school youth from 5.1 to 3.6 million, enabled the country to reduce the rate of population increase and eventually increased its workforce as a result of more qualified and highly skilled youth released to

[8] KDHS defines high risk sexual behavior as sex with a non – married or non-cohabiting sexual partner.

the job market thus reducing the dependency ratio and propelling the country from a low income to a high income country (Opiyo & Agwanda, 2011).

- *Resource Conflicts*

This rapid population increase will strain the environment due to overuse of natural resources such as water and land. With more people demanding for scarce resources, environmental degradation and global warming, resource conflicts can only escalate, militarizing the environment even more.

- *Increased demand for more employment*

There will be a continued demand for more employment due to the increasing number of youth joining the job market at a faster rate than the jobs are being created. Continued exclusion of youth from a productive role in the economy will inevitably exacerbate crime, drug abuse, vandalism, religious fanaticism and escalate the vicious cycle of poverty if no holistic approach is initiated to alter the employment challenges facing the youth (Sivi-Njonjo, 2010). Given that unemployment among urban youths is much higher, large cohorts of idle youth will be easy to recruit to criminal gangs. Table 15 shows some of the criminal groups operating in Kenya.

Table 15: Examples of criminal gangs in Kenya

Name Group (s)	**Reason for Existence and/or source of information**
'The army / boys of Beirut'	Gun-wielding hijackers and muggers who pounce on motorists and commuters (Daily Nation, 10 April 2006) *Kenya: Eastlands: Where Life is Nasty, Brutish And Short*)
Bumps Ahead	Daily Nation (19 February 2010)
Karanja Youth andKaberenge	Daily Nation (19 February 2010)
Yes We Can[9]	Daily Nation (19 February 2010)
12 Flamingos	Daily Nation (19 February 2010)
Bunkers[10] also referred to as 14 Gendarmerie	Daily Nation (19 February 2010)
Kosovo[11] also referred to as the 12 Disciples	Daily Nation (19 February 2010)

[9] Not yet profiled by the police
[10] Currently redundant but are reviving with new names
[11] Currently redundant

Tuff Gong	Daily Nation (19 February 2010)
Dego Youths	Daily Nation (19 February 2010)
40 Ndugus	Daily Nation (19 February 2010)
ODM Youths	Daily Nation (19 February 2010)
Darajani	Daily Nation (19 February 2010)
Jipange[12]	Daily Nation (19 February 2010)
Super 14	Daily Nation (19 February 2010)
Thaai[13]	Daily Nation (19 February 2010)
Wailer groups[14]	Daily Nation (19 February 2010)
Kenda Kenda	Daily Nation (19 February 2010)
Bantu	Daily Nation (19 February 2010)
Ngoroko	Daily Nation (19 February 2010)
Nyalenda Base	Daily Nation (19 February 2010)
The Chief Squad	Daily Nation (19 February 2010)
Nyamasira Massive	Daily Nation (19 February 2010)
Baghdad for Peace	Daily Nation (19 February 2010)
Karamojong Boys	Daily Nation (19 February 2010)
Saba Saba	Daily Nation (19 February 2010)
Artur Margaryan	Daily Nation (19 February 2010)
Kebago	Daily Nation (19 February 2010)
Angola Msumbiji	The Standard (20 October 2010)
Banyamulenge	The Standard (20 October 2010)
Charo Shutu	The Standard (20 October 2010)
Coast Housing Land Network	The Standard (20 October 2010)
Congo by Force	The Standard (20 October 2010)
Dallas Muslim Youth	The Standard (20 October 2010)
Japo Group	The Standard (20 October 2010)
Kamkunji Youth Group	The Standard (20 October 2010)
Makande Army	The Standard (20 October 2010)
Sakina Youth	The Standard (20 October 2010)
Siafu	The Standard (20 October 2010)

Source: (Sivi-Njonjo, 2011)

- *Weak Economies*

Many of the countries with young and youthful populations have among the world's weakest economies due to high dependency ratios. According to PAI (2010), between 1970 and 1999, these countries experienced an average annual economic growth rate of 3.6 percent. This growth can increase if young people are economically empowered to allow greater personal savings and investments. However, continued denial of economic opportunities to them will lead to a shrinking per capita income. Unemployment eventually leads to frustrations that trigger political

[12] Not yet profiled by the police
[13] Is said to be a version of Mungiki
[14] Is said to be a version of Mungiki

instability, making it even more difficult for poor countries with large youth populations to generate economic growth and encourage the foreign and domestic investment needed to generate new jobs. In a capitalist society, the distinction between the have and the have not's is very clear. Drawing from discourses of political theory and sociology of collective behavior and mass movement, increased poverty and inequality among Kenyan youth can only increase attacks and counter attacks between the have and the have-nots.

- *Increased rate of rural to urban migration*

An increasing number of 15-29 year olds will inevitably increase the rate of rural to urban migration beyond the current urban annual growth rate of 4%. This is due to the fact that most migrants to urban areas come as young adults (15-29) to look for employment in cities. Development transformations necessary to support this growth and enhance the quality of urban life is not occurring at the same rate (Sivi-Njonjo, 2010). If this trend continues, a faster increase of informal settlements[15] will be witnessed. Low security enforcement in slums mean more people will self organize to provide their own security because they are neglected by security apparatus hence an increase in crime control vigilante activities mainly carried out by young men. Some of the existing groups are depicted on table 16 and they mostly operate in slum areas.

Table 16: Examples of Crime Control Vigilante Groups[16]

Group	Area of Operation	Ethnic Affiliation	Operation	Source of Information
Mungiki	All of Central province; Laikipia, Nakuru, Naivasha, Korogocho, Githurai, Kariobangi, Mathare, Kayole and Dandora	Kikuyu	Security provision for residential homes and small businesses, rent and transport extortion, water and sanitary provision	Keriga & Bujra (2009, March); Anderson (2002); IRIN (2008, February 22); KNDR (2009)
Taliban	Kariobangi North, Mathare, Huruma, Baba Dogo, and Kariobangi South	Luo	Security and matatu extortion	Anderson (2002); IRIN (2008, February 22); Gecaga (2007) ; KNDR (2009)
Baghdad Boys	Kibera, Nyanza	Luo	Security	IRIN (2008, February 22); Gecaga (2007) ; KNDR (2009)

[15] Also referred to as slums

[16] The groups in this section are depicted from their crime control perspective. This table does not enumerate the other vigilante functions and roles a group does outside crime control.

Kosovo	Kibera	Luo and Luhya	Security	IRIN (2008, February 22); Gecaga (2007) ; KNDR (2009)
Siafu	Kibera	Luo	Security	KNDR (2009)
Bukhungu	Kibera	Luhya	Security	KNDR (2009)
Labour Youth	Kibera	Nubi	Security	KNDR (2009)
Muungano wa Wanavijiji (The Organization of the Villagers)	Nairobi slum areas such as Kibera, Korogosho, Mathare	Mixed	Established among the slum-dwellers of the city to fight evictions and protect tenants.	Anderson (2002)
Group of Forty	Dandora Estates	Mixed	Security	Anderson (2002)
Kamjesh	Kariobangi, Huruma, Dandora	Mixed (Kikuyu, Luo, Maasai, Kisii and the Luhya) but dominated by Kikuyu and Luo Youth	Levied matatus *(Mini buses)*plying the Kariobangi-city route by helping them fill up with passagers in return for a token Sh20 (an equivalent of US$ 0.4 then) per vehicle. The maintained a semblance of order and security in the bus terminus which was crime prone	Gecaga (2007); IRIN (2008, February 22) ; KNDR (2009); Okombo & Sana, (2010).
Bakongo	Kawangware	Congolese	Security	Okombo & Sana, (2010).
Borana	Korogocho	Somali and Borana community	Security	Okombo & Sana, (2010).
Zungu Zungu	Shauri Moyo	Mixed residents	Security	Anyumba (2003)
Mathare Progressive Youth Group	Mathare Valley, area 4	Mixed tribes of young men	Security, garbage collection	Anyumba (2003)
The Hague	Kirinyaga District	Residents of Kirinyaga	Counter *Mungiki* harassment and provide security	Nation and Standard Newspapers dated April 2009
Chinkoror	Mainly Borabu and Gucha	Abagusii	Guarding territory against cattle rustlers and other perceived "enemies"	IRIN (2008, February 22); www.Kisii.com; KNDR (2009)
Sungusungu	Suneka, Bonchari and the suburbs of Kisii town	Kuria and Abagusii	Security and resolve domestic disputes	Fleisher, (2000); www.Kisii.com
Kebago	Kisii	Abagusii	Security	KNDR (2009)
Other Community Crime Prevention Associations (CMCA's)	City Estates	Mainly residents of that particular estate	Security and crime prevention	

Source: Sivi-Njonjo (2011)

- *Rise of Civil Conflicts*

According to PAI (2010), between 1970 and 1999, 80% of civil conflicts occurred in countries where 60% of the population or more were under the age of thirty. In countries where youth make up to 35 percent of the total adult population, the risk of conflict increases by 150 percent. 90% of countries with very young population structures had autocratic or weakly democratic governments at the end of the 20th century. As a result, their young people tend to perpetuate the cycle of political instability, ethnic wars, revolutions, and anti-regime activities. Low political will and inadequate resources to effectively integrate them into meaningfully participate in decision making also makes them feel excluded thus exhibiting open aggression and conflict through self organization or by being exploited and manipulated by e.g. politicians. According to the Kenya Thabiti Taskforce (2009), formed by inter-denominational groups to investigate Kenya's post election violence, found out that young people in Kenya are so disillusioned by the political class. Anderson (2002) in reviewing vigilantism in Kenya from the context of political violence argues that vigilante groups in Kenya will continue be used as political instruments in the electoral struggle. Table 17 lists some of the already active groups that perpetrate political violence.

Table 17: Examples of Privatized Official Vigilante Groups in Kenya

Name of Vigilante Group (s)	Area of Operation	Reason for Existence and source of information
KANU Youth Wingers formed in the 1960s	Countrywide	During the clamor for Independence, many African young men in the Kenya Boy Scouts Association (KBSA) left and joined youth wings of political parties that promised their members jobs and positions of authority. By 1963, KANU youth wingers began acting as self-appointed policemen and judges while collecting money for their "services". In particular, Kikuyu leaders of a section of the KANU Youth Wing in Kiambu were planning to form a new military organization to replace the Kenyan Army under the leadership of former Mau Mau generals. The youth wingers disdained rival groups, and often attacked uniformed scouts as government stooges (Parsons, undated). According to Okombo & Sana (2010), the mid- 1980's though marked the rise of political thuggery in its current form. The KANU government allowed the provincial administration to allocate civilians security management duties in the slums. Ideal recruits were youth of average education aged between 20 and 35. These young men would later be recruited as Youth Wingers to ensure compliance.
Sri Lanka and the Kuzacha Boys	Slums and estates in	Activities linked to rival political factions in the town (Anderson, 2002)

formed in the 1980s	Mombasa district	
Baghdad Boys formed in 1991	Nyanza province and Kibera	Formed at the time of the Iraq war in 1991 when Kenya was experiencing an outburst of political violence prior to the 1992 elections, the *Baghdad Boys* targeted opponents of a prominent Kisumu political clique. The group achieved national notoriety after its members successfully broke into a police station and a chief's camp to free detained colleagues (Anderson, 2002; IRIN, 2008, February 22)
Kaya Bombo Youth formed in 1997	Kwale district	Instigated by prominent politicians and with the support of the government and military. They were deployed to foment ethnic violence in the run-up to the 1997 elections at the coast. The group is blamed for the massacre of 70 people in Kwale, and the murder of six policemen at Likoni (Anderson, 2002).
Chinkororo formed in the 1990s	Kisii	According to Anderson (2002), they muster support during political campaigns.
Amachuma formed in the 1990s	Kisii	According to the Nation (13 March 2002) as quoted by the IRBC (2002, December 5), Amachuma, means 'a piece of metal'. According to Kisii.com (2009 May 19), Amachuma is loosely used in light of the metaphore above to mean any tough youth that hangs around politicians during campaigns. These young people are used as bodyguards or to "protect vested interests" of politicians.
Jeshi la Mzee/Majeshi ya Wazee formed in April 1997	Nationwide	KANU, determined to contain opposition activities, the Moi government transformed *Vijana na KANU* (which was a remnant of the Youth for KANU 92) into president's civilian army – *jeshi la mzee* (Okombo & Sana, 2010). According to Anderson (2002), they: disrupted a pro-reform rally at Nairobi's Kamukunji grounds; played a pivotal role in the election campaign of Fred Gumo, the KANU candidate in Nairobi's Westlands Constituency; disrupted Charity Kaluki Ngilu's presidential campaign in the Kamba area; were caught on camera in 1999 attacking and inflicting serious injuries upon Presbyterian Church of East Africa (PCEA) clergyman Timothy Njoya, who was part of a peaceful demonstration near to the parliament buildings in Nairobi
Jeshi la Embakasi	Nairobi's Eastlands area	Were supporters of the late David Mwenje and have been linked to land protests and terrorizing tenants in Nairobi estates. It is rumored that members of the *Jeshi la Embakasi* are also active supporters of *Mungiki* (Anderson, 2002).
Runyenjes Football Club	Runyenjes, Embu	Formed as a sports association by local MP Njeru Kathangu and used as a base for mobilizing his political support (Anderson, 2002).
Jeshi la King'ole	Ukambani	Formed to counter external political aggression in the Ukambani region by John Harun Mwau, formerly director of the Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority (KACA) and leader of the opposition Party of Independent Candidates of Kenya (PICK). The football club became a vehicle for the mobilization of political support for rallies and other public events, could disrupt activities and are said to have been ruthlessness in dealing with their paymaster's rivals. The group had 400 recruits (Anderson, 2002).
NDP supporters	Langata constituency in Nairobi	Well organized in defending Raila Odinga political interests (Anderson, 2002).
Hit Squad	Murang'a	Employed by Joseph Kamotho (Anderson, 2002).

	district	
Jeshi la Mbela	Taita- Taveta.	Private militia owned by Darius Mbela (Anderson, 2002).
Kalenjin warriors	Rift Valley	Young men in these ethnic groups undergo circumcision as a rite of passage, and as a result, develop a certain esprit de corps with their age mates, a trait that facilitates mobilization. It is these young Kalenjin men that form the *Kalenjin warrior* groups (IRIN 2008, February 22).
Maasai Morans	Rift Valley	Mobilized by politicians to perpetuate conflict
Mungiki	Central Nairobi, Rift Valley Provinces	Politicians have used the Mungiki to intimidate Kenyans into supporting particular parties or candidates. The Mungiki also believe that the political leadership of this country should always be headed by a Kikuyu, as prophesied by Mugo wa Kibiru. So they accept as true that it is upon them to organize a revolution to usurp political power and 'return' it to the Kikuyu (*gucokia uthamaki kwa nyumba ya mugikuyu*), from whom it was stolen after the death of Jomo Kenyatta, the first president of Kenya. For this to happen, they believe, violence and bloodshed similar to the MauMau liberation struggle is inevitable. They accuse the government of pursuing policies that impoverish Kenyans. Therefore, they do not respect the law, which they perceive as perpetuating tyranny (Kamungi, 2002 December)[17]

Source: Sivi-Njonjo, 2011

- *Terrorism*

The continued existence of porous borders with Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan and Northern Uganda fosters an environment that is amenable to exploitation by extremists and criminal groups. In addition to a lack of adequate border security, Kenya like many other African countries also relies on corrupt intelligence personnel. Unless we establish effective, transparent, accountable and responsible governments and without substantial capacity building in the areas of analysis, detection and prevention, Kenya will increasingly find it difficult to keep out such elements (Makinda, 2007). According to Barno (2007), Somali-based international terrorist groups have set up infrastructure within the country and it is plausible that they could have local sympathizers and supporters. Continued marginalization of young people, especially in northern Kenya is increasing their enrolment in these groups.

5.0 Policy Recommendations

All countries have some policies strategies and frameworks that respond to demographic and/or youth issues as indicated in this section. The list of policies, strategies and frameworks is not in any way exhaustive but is indicative of the elaborate effort made by country governments to address

[17] This is a contradiction to their practices because they extort poor people for their own gain

youth issues. Because these issues are cross cutting, they are housed in different government ministries. Lack of coordination among them and low budget allocations lead to ineffective implementation. Few, if any, make a correlation between youth and the future challenges that will be posed by the demographic factor.

Policies should be geared towards achieving **a favorable age structure.** According to PAI (2010), favorable age structures, though they vary depending on a country's economic prospects and its government's security intentions, generally include a large proportion of the population comprised of working-age adults, with smaller proportions and slower growth among dependent children and older adults. A favorable age structure provides a sufficient tax base for government services and a social safety net for the more dependent age groups.

Population age structures can shift relatively rapidly and sometimes dramatically in response to policies and programs. Economically and socially significant shifts in age structure can occur in under a decade, and profound reconfigurations of the profile can occur in 25 years, as happened in Iran (see figure 2) due to decline from high to low birthrates. Policies and programmes that East African countries could adopt include:

5.1 Adequate Investment in Reproductive Health

A significant proportion of women in Eastern Africa have an unmet need for family planning. Increased access to family planning facilities for all women will be key in reducing the TFR. These women also need to be educated on benefits of small family sizes to remove the cultural taboos attached to contraceptives. Religious institutions that oppose family planning should be a major target group due the influence they have. Reproductive health education among sexually active youth and provision of youth friendly services are other ways in which population increase can be controlled especially among teenagers who increasingly engage in risky sexual behavior. Public health improvements such as more comprehensive access to clean water and better sanitation increases the share of children surviving to adolescence.

5.2 Education of the Girl Child

Studies have shown that education affects many aspects of life, including individual demographic and health behavior. Educational level is strongly associated with contraceptive use, fertility, and the general health status, morbidity, and mortality of children. Co-relations have especially been made on the linkages between education and number of children a woman chooses to have. According to PAI (2010), girls' education delays marriage and increases chances of the woman's employment outside the home. These have played important roles in improving nutrition and decreasing mortality in childhood, and increasing the demand for contraception in adulthood. In turn, increased use of contraception leads to a decline in fertility rates.

5.3 Adequate and Relevant Education for Work

High unemployment in the region is partly because of the fact that the bulk of the labor force has only achieved primary school education which is not enough to adequately function in modernizing economies. The education is also not up-to date and as relevant to the job market. Adequately investing in the enrollment and completion rates of young people in secondary school, tertiary and university as well as improving quality and relevance of education to adequately prepare young people for work and life worked the magic in Korea in the 70's. Meaningful economic opportunities will enable young people to save and invest thus widening the country's tax base. It would present a 'window of opportunity' to reduce dependency and poverty due to the increased ratio of the working age population.

5.4 Urbanization

Increasing number of young people in the region will only exacerbate the rate of rural-urban migration which is faster than the rate of city expansions. The rural-urban differentials in development will therefore not hold for long. There is need to anticipate these trends and proactively put in place responsive urban management policies.

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